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AbstRAct
The mainstream literature on skilled Diasporas has focused on economically-induced professional 
migration and free-choice mobility of educational elites. The author introduces the concept of 
conflict-induced displacement of skilled refugees (cidsr) to study skilled Syrian refugees as po-
litical migrants who flee from violence and conflict in their home countries. She uses a cross-case 
analysis of seven oecd countries (Brazil, Canada, Germany, Mexico, Turkey, the U.K., and the U.S.) 
to prove that the Syrian cidsr is a crisis but also an economic and political opportunity. oecd coun-
tries take advantage of the skilled refugees in order to maintain growth in their aging economies, 
solve brain drain caused by internal conflict, as well as to strengthen their status as moral powers. 
Key words: conflict-induced displacement of the skilled (cids), brain gain, Syrian refugees, oecd
Resumen 
Las corrientes dominantes sobre diásporas calificadas se han centrado en la migración profe-
sional inducida económicamente y en la movilidad de libre elección de las élites educativas. Se 
presenta el concepto de desplazamiento de refugiados calificados inducido por conflicto (cidsr, 
por sus siglas en inglés) para estudiar a los refugiados sirios calificados como migrantes políticos 
que huyen de la violencia y el conflicto. Utiliza un estudio de casos cruzados de siete países de la 
ocde (Brasil, Canadá, Alemania, México, Turquía, Reino Unido y Estados Unidos) para dem-
ostrar que la cidsr siria es una crisis, pero también una oportunidad económica y política. Los 
refugiados calificados en estos países hacen crecer sus economías envejecidas, resuelven la fuga 
de cerebros o fortalecen su condición de poderes morales.
Palabras clave: desplazamiento de personal calificado inducido por conflicto, ganancia de ce-
rebros, refugiados sirios, ocde.
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A review of the mainstream literature on skilled migration shows very few recent stud-
ies of skilled refugees in general and even fewer on Syrians in particular. This gap in 
the literature on conflict-induced displacement of skilled professionals (cidsr) may be 
explained in various ways: first, it may be due to the difficulty of obtaining reliable 
quantitative and qualitative data; second, it could be due to their assumed small 
numbers in comparison to the overall quantity of temporary migrants; and third, it 
may be explained by their selection based on humanitarian considerations rather 
than on human capital attributes, as DeVoretz, Pivnenko, and Beiser (2004) assume.
Migrants in general and refugees in particular have often been viewed as up-
rooted people who could be a menace for the economy and social stability of desti-
nation countries. An earlier study by Malkki (1995: 26) deals with the “sedentarist 
metaphysics” that comes from our conception of the world as a “discrete spatial par-
titioning of territory” in the segmented fashion of the multicolored school atlas. The 
term “the nation” is commonly described using metaphoric synonyms like “the coun-
try,” “the land,” and “the soil” (Malkki, 1995: 26).
Compared to skilled economic migrants, Syrian refugees are people with roots in 
their country; they are connected to their territory and their migration is sudden and 
forced. They did not plan it, and that makes the process a lot more shocking than in the 
case of economic migrants. Furthermore, we do not know whether the migration of 
Syrian professionals is temporary or permanent. While previous studies show that 
only a fraction are likely to permanently resettle (Zong and Batalova, 2017), many of 
the skilled Syrians in the Diaspora do not themselves know if they will return or not. 
When compared to the voluntary mobility of skilled workers through transnation-
al companies or to the planned migration of what the previous literature has studied 
as the median skilled worker, skilled refugees are an extreme case both in numbers and 
context. As such, they are considered separately from economic migrants. However, 
previous academic experience has shown that extreme cases themselves can serve to 
broaden our view on the wider context of skilled professionals’ migration.
This study explores the hypothesis that Syrian cidsr is used by receiving oecd 
countries with two main purposes: a) to balance human capital needs to solve 
brain drain caused by internal conflict (Turkey) or to maintain growth in aging econ-
omies (Canada, Germany, and the UK); and, b) to strengthen their status as moral 
powers (Brazil, Mexico, and the U.S.).1 In short, Syrian skilled refugees pose a 
1  Moral power is a concept introduced by Sharp (1960) and later applied by Goren and Chapp (2017) to 
study how public opinion on culture war issues shapes partisan predispositions and religious orientations.




humanitarian crisis but also an economic and political opportunity for the main des-
tination countries.
The purpose of this article is to offer a general view of the integration of skilled 
Syrian refugees into various countries and to identify different political approaches 
that could also serve as starting points for new field research. I combine the theoretical 
background of migration theory with case study techniques typical of international 
relations studies. Due to the lack of a regional policy for refugees in North America 
and Europe, a comparison among regions was not feasible. This study is narrowed, 
then, to a selection of seven oecd countries with significant international roles as ref-
ugee hosts: the main receiver of Syrian refugees in the world (Turkey), two Europe-
an countries (Germany and the UK); two in North America (Canada and the U.S.), 
and two Latin American countries (Mexico and Brazil). The study was limited to 
these seven destinations taking into account the scarcity of information specifically 
regarding skilled refugees.
Previous literature on refugees has focused on the humanitarian aspects of their 
integration and very few studies have divided Syrian refugees into skilled and un-
skilled; this may be due to the novelty of the problem, the difficulty of identifying 
how many skilled individuals are living inside or outside the camps, and even ethical 
reasons. Since it is a humanitarian problem, it may seem unjust to give more relevance 
to one type of refugee in particular. However, I believe that comparing different pop-
ulations among the Syrian refugees does not mean that we ignore the unskilled; 
on the contrary, we try to see if selectivity is applied when humanitarian purposes 
should prevail.
My main research questions are: How is conflict-induced displacement different 
from economically-driven skilled migration? Why do the countries selected accept 
Syrian refugees, and what are their integration policies compared to those for other 
migrants? Are traditional approaches on skilled migration useful for studying the 
vulnerability of skilled refugees? 
The article is structured in four main parts: a) theoretical approaches to conflict-
induced migration; b) general characteristics of Syrian refugees; c) cross-case analy-
sis of the selected host countries; and, d) conclusions.
theoReticAl bAckgRound 
Skilled refugees are not a new subject of analysis, as there is previous literature on 
intellectual exile (Said, 1993, among others). However, the figure of the skilled refugee 
has powerfully re-emerged in the current context of global migration crisis. Skilled 




refugees, in particular Syrians, are not the typical cosmopolitan professional seeking 
to travel and not be bound to particular territories; skilled Syrians are not the scientific 
nomads of our times. Paraphrasing from a classic book on exile written in the nine-
teenth century by Victor Hugo (2014: 36), for the exiled, any land is the same as long 
as it is not the Syrian land. Exile is not a material problem, but rather a moral one.
Civelek (2017: 27-28) studies refugees as liminal subjects of international relations, 
citizens of their home countries but devoid of territory and without economic rights. 
Refugees in general are ambiguous individuals, finding themselves in an uncertain 
“transition” period, with no clear future. “The designation ‘refugee’ suffices alone to 
isolate her/him in the socio-political field. Moreover, as a member of a sub-popula-
tion, the refugee poses a ‘problem’ to the upper-population” (Civelek, 2017: 28).
Due to the scant previous evidence on Syrian skilled refugees, we assume their 
situation is similar to the overall cohort of population in exile and that their roles are 
different from economically-driven migrants. As such, academically outstanding views 
on the economic migration of professionals are not suited to, or even clash with, the 
topic of cidsr. I will, however, touch on studies that may help us compare conflict-
induced and economically-induced skilled migration. For instance, the proposal of a 
Global Skills Partnership (Clemens, 2015), which involves an ex-ante public-private 
agreement to link skill formation and skilled migration for the mutual benefit of 
countries of origin, destination countries, and migrants, is not possible in a context 
of ethnic conflict and civil war. This type of brain drain is difficult to anticipate.
Recent literature on cosmopolitan identity might also clash with our object of 
study. For example, Skovgaard-Smith and Poulfelt (2018) show how foreign-based 
professionals define themselves as “non-nationals,” downplaying their own nation-
al affiliations and cultural differences. According to these authors, professional elites 
in the Diaspora demarcate their cosmopolitan “us” in relation to their original na-
tional (mono) culture. This type of cosmopolitan identity as a mode of collective 
belonging, part of a wider discourse of globalization, certainly coexists with the con-
flict-induced displacement of the skilled, but the two require very different method-
ological strategies.
Another approach to the skilled migrant´s identity is the quality distinction or 
discrimination between migrants’ qualities: skilled vs. unskilled. Cranston (2017: 2) 
starts from a linguistic observation: while migrants are expected to stay abroad, it is 
presumed that “expatriates” will return to their home country. In the context of the 
rise in popularity of far right parties in Europe and the U.S., the former are considered 
bad and the latter, good. Restrictive migration policies would prioritize expatriates, 
but not migrants. The skilled “good” migrant is now expected to go abroad, work, 
and return to his/her home country. The questions that immediately emerge are: Do 




Syrian refugees plan to return? Are they able to? Are they good or bad, in terms of 
their contribution to the country of origin?
However, other aspects of the current discussion on skilled migration may be 
extremely useful for gaining insight about skilled refugees. Surprisingly, I may re-
turn to the discussion of knowledge colonialism and dependency theory (Maniglio, 
2017: 28), which criticizes the way in which main destination countries define immi-
gration quotas to reinforce their power over knowledge production and reproduction. 
In the case of refugees, being skilled is a double-edge sword, as they are eligible to an 
exclusive citizenship, being admitted into a country (such as Turkey), but they may 
not be allowed to leave, because of their skills. 
The questions about skilled refugees and ethnic conflict have been addressed, to 
my knowledge, in four papers that precede this one: two based on statistical models 
(Bang and Mitra, 2013; Christensen, Onul, and Singh, 2018) and two qualitative eco-
nomic analyses (Smith, 2016; Uzelac et al., 2018).
First, the pioneering study of Bang and Mitra (2013: 387) finds that ethnic civil war 
increases the fraction of tertiary skilled emigrants and also reduces the stock of pro-
fessionals in the country of origin. Long-lasting ethnic civil wars may lead to the forma-
tion of skilled Diasporas that may eventually help with the resolution of conflict and 
the reconstruction of their economy of origin. Bang and Mitra’s model proves the 
importance of the conflict’s duration, in which each additional year of ethnic civil war 
increases the fraction of highly skilled emigrants by a minimum of 0.7 percent (2013: 
399). In line with the mainstream economic literature on skilled migration, Bang and 
Mitra also confirm the positive effect of skilled migrants –in this case, refugees– for 
the host country. 
Five years later, Christensen, Onul, and Singh (2018: 25) supplemented Bang 
and Mitra’s study, showing that ethnic wars and conflicts also change the proportion 
of educated people in the economy. In this way, predictions may be made about hu-
man capital flight, therefore aiding in making effective policy recommendations.
A different qualitative study by Smith (2016: 29) calls for changing our perspec-
tive on refugees from burden to “boon,” appreciating their economic value, and 
adopting the “economy of sharing” typical of Islamic economies. Starting from field-
work on the Syrian skilled refugees arriving in Germany, Smith elaborates on how 
the sharing economy redistributes surplus to a community. This economic model 
refers to the sharing of access instead of individual ownership and offers the potential 
for refugees to help one another and their local community, as well as to allow the 
local community to help them (Smith, 2016: 53-55).
A last study, by Uzelac, Meester, Goransson, and van den Berg (2018, 35), seems to 
be a continuation of Smith’s proposal, since they describe two types of capital relevant 




for studying refugees: bonding capital, which is created among members of refugee 
groups, and bridging capital, which refers to the connections between individual 
refugees and outside actors, such as citizens of the host community or aid agencies. 
A third type, social capital, may also strengthen the position of people vulnerable to 
exploitation, since in-group networks can warn them of exploitative or unreliable 
employers or landlords. All three types of capital are relevant for the study of skilled 
Syrian refugees.
geneRAl chARActeRistics oF syRiAn ReFugees
The conflict in Syria started in 2011 with protests against President Bashar al-Assad, 
at the time of the Arab Spring. Since then, the civil war has prompted the internal or 
international displacement of two-thirds of the Syrian population. Some studies also 
attribute this conflict to climate change (Kelley et al., 2015), which would mean that 
Syrian refugees are both climate and political displaced persons. More recent research 
by Sirkeci, Unutulmaz, and Utku (2017: 1-2) attributes the Syrian refugee crisis to 
what they call the “3Ds of human mobility: demographic deficit, development defi-
cit, and democratic deficit,” all sped up by the civil war, but present in Syria before 
2011. Their study finds that the present refugee crisis was preceded by a generalized 
desire to migrate among the Syrian population that exploded during the later hu-
manitarian crisis.
International efforts were made to de-escalate the conflict and make return a more 
plausible plan for many Syrians. By May 2017, international intermediaries of the 
conflict (Russia, Iran, and Turkey) advanced the implementation of “de-escalation 
zones,” and talks were held on post-war reconstruction and the return of Syrian ref-
ugees to Syria (Vignal, 2018). However, in April 2018, the United States, France, and 
Britain launched airstrikes to punish President Bashar al-Assad for a suspected 
chemical attack.
To sum up, the conflict has been going on for seven years now and is far from 
over. The country’s infrastructure has collapsed and 85 percent of the remaining Syr-
ians now live in poverty (Vignal, 2018). Ninety-five percent of people lack adequate 
healthcare and 70 percent lack regular access to clean water. Half of the children are 
out of school. In 2017, the estimated number of victims since the beginning of the civil 
war was 470 000 people killed, 55 000 of them children (World Vision, 2017).
Of Syria’s former population of 21 million, about two-thirds have left their homes; 
in 2017, an estimated 6.3 million were internally displaced and 7 to 8 million were in-
ternational migrants. This scale of population displacement has not been seen since 




World War II (Nowrasteh, 2016). Previously populated areas have been largely de-
stroyed and emptied of their inhabitants, while others, mostly in the regions held by 
the al-Assad regime, are now crammed with displaced Syrians (Vignal, 2018).
Most of the Syrian refugees are to be found in neighboring countries: with Tur-
key and Lebanon hosting 3 and 1 million Syrian refugees, respectively (World Vision, 
2017; also see Figure 1). The Gulf States host about 1.2 million Syrians on work visas, 
but they are not legally considered refugees or asylum seekers because those nations 
are not signatories to the unhcr commission (Nowrasteh, 2016). At the peak of the 
European migrant crisis in 2015, 1.3 million Syrians requested asylum in Europe 
(World Vision, 2017). About 60 000 Syrians were received in North America (World 
Vision Staff, 2017).
Figure 1
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF INTERNATIONALLY 
DISPLACED SYRIANS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (2017)
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Sources: World Vision (2017); Zong and Batalova (2017).
Before the war, population surveys in Syria cited an 87 percent Muslim majori-
ty, with relevant consequences in terms of economic analysis (Smith, 2016: cxxxvi). 
As Smith shows, the principles of Islamic finance are to ensure that the few do not 




accumulate wealth while others suffer; individuals who obey the rules of Islamic fi-
nance are presumably community minded and therefore in accordance with the ide-
als of social entrepreneurship.
As a matter of fact, private business has been a common trend in Syria for many 
years. In 2011, nearly 35 percent of the Syrian work force was self-employed. By 
comparison, the United States, home to Silicon Valley and one of the leading hubs 
for entrepreneurship in the world, had only 6.8 percent self-employment in the same 
year (Smith, 2016: cxl).
Syrian population demographics contain a number of statistics that reflect the 
existence of robust human capital. As of 2011, 86.4 percent of the total population 
was literate, defined as the percentage of the population over the age of 15 who could 
read and write. Ninety-seven percent of Syrian children were enrolled in primary 
school, making Syria a leader in education among its peers in the region. Before the 
war, in the early 2000s, at any given time there were 100 000 Syrians in university, 
over 6 percent of the population at the time (Smith, 2016: cxliii).
These features are now reflected in the overall characteristics of Syrian refugees. 
Some studies have identified two generalized profiles of Syrian refugees: poorer, ru-
ral workers based in camps in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon; and richer, middle-class 
professionals living outside of refugee camps, recently migrating to Europe via Greece 
and the Western Balkans (Sasnal, 2015). It has thus been assumed that Syrians in 
Europe come from the richer part of Syrian society, previously employed outside of 
the agricultural sector (in services, trade, construction, health service, and education), 
with university studies, economically active, and accustomed to gender equality 
(Sasnal, 2015: 1). They are also the ones who could afford a trip of thousands of euros 
to Europe.
Political science professor Barry Stein points out that, “[Syrian] refugees are not 
poor people. They have not failed within their homeland; they are successful, promi-
nent, well-integrated, educated individuals who fled because of fear of persecution” 
(Smith, 2016: cxlvii). To be sure, a survey of 305 Syrian refugees in Austria, the Neth-
erlands, and the United Kingdom (Betts et al., 2017) shows that 38 percent of them 
had a university education, and one-third had been employed in either skilled work 
or the professional services industry in Syria. Due to their high educational levels, it 
has been assumed that they may contribute to the economies of the destination coun-
tries. A study by Global Ministries (2018) shows that the main countries receiving 
Syrian refugees have experienced a growth in their gdp from 2017 to 2018 by 3.5 per-
cent (Turkey), 2 percent (Lebanon), and 3.5 percent (Jordan).




cRoss-cAse AnAlysis oF selected host countRies
Method
I gathered information on the overall conditions of the reception of Syrian refugees 
in seven oecd countries: Turkey, Germany, the UK, Canada, the U.S., Mexico, and 
Brazil.2 What follows is a cross-case comparison of the policies on Syrian refugees in 
these countries, in order to assess various national approaches for dealing with the 
Syrian cidsr.
The analysis is structured on five levels of study: a) foreign policies for the accep-
tance of Syrian refugees; b) domestic policies and national legislation; c) private and 
not-for-profit initiatives; d) the social and economic composition of Syrian cidsr; and, 
e) testimonies of Syrian skilled refugees. These five levels of analysis are not necessar-
ily exhaustive or the most socially relevant, but they are the ones that could be actually 
used for an equitable comparison, based on the available data in the academic litera-
ture, governmental and ngo reports, and media features. In comparison to a multiple 
case study that would explain each difference by country, I chose to present the anal-
ysis according to each variable of study that develops a certain level of analysis.
Foreign Policies for the Acceptance of Syrian Refugees
The seven selected countries have diverse approaches to receiving refugees, and 
they all signed the 1951 Refugees Convention, except the U.S., which is only part of 
the 1967 un Protocol Related to the Status of Refugees. Central to these two agree-
ments is the principle of non-refoulement, that is, no refugee should be returned in 
any manner to a country or territory in which his or her life or freedom would be 
threatened. The convention also prohibits the restriction of refugees’ rights to go to a 
third country (Diab, 2017).
According to the Dublin Regulation applied in Europe, the first country where 
an asylum seeker arrives is responsible for processing his/her application and reset-
tling him/her, which explains the high concentration of Syrian refugees in certain 
countries like Turkey or Greece. To ease the burden in these two destinations, EU 
leaders agreed on a voluntary system for sharing and redistributing the refugees 
(Gilbert, 2017: 24-25).
2  The information will be analysed in this order, from the closest to the furthest, with Syria as the point of 
departure. 




However, Turkey has been the main receiver of Syrian refugees, admitting 3 mil-
lion Syrians since the start of the crisis in their country; those 3 million make up 3.5 
percent of the Turkish population. Most of the refugees applying for asylum in Europe 
or North America have first passed through Turkey, a country that acts as a nodal 
point for conflict-induced displacement.
According to EU rules, after a refugee arrives in the European Union, he or she 
must wait between six and nine months to be granted asylum (Smith, 2016). This means 
that the refugees are granted temporary residence permits, but they cannot work 
till they obtain the status of asylum, which allows them access to work, education, lan-
guage classes, and the social insurance system. The application process may last for 
a year, during which the refugees cannot apply for asylum in another country. This 
procedure was applied by Germany and also by the UK before it announced its exit 
from the EU. 
The majority of the Syrians accepted in Europe are males, half of them under 24, 
a fact explained by the dangers of human trafficking along the route; this is also de-
scribed as “asylum Darwinism.” Even though they generally do not speak the language 
of the country where they arrive, these men are assumed to integrate to the economy 
and serve to sustain Europe’s demographic stability and economic growth. Therefore 
the acceptance of refugees in general and Syrians in particular, has also been charac-
terized as “an example of economic pragmatism” (Loo, 2016). 
A significant proportion of the Syrian refugees, especially the educated ones, 
who arrive with the biggest cohort to Turkey, Greece, Italy, Lebanon, and other neigh-
boring countries, afterwards apply for asylum in Germany, the country that takes in 
most of the refugees in the EU. Over the past 30 years, Germany received 30 percent 
of all the asylum applications in Europe, a greater share than any other country (Loo, 
2016). According to the same author, this may be due to Germany’s image as a dem-
ocratic country where laws are respected, but also to the strong Diaspora networks 
that help reproduce the intake of certain populations, for instance, from the Middle East 
and African countries like Somalia, Libya, Sudan, Eritrea, or Nigeria. Actually, the 
German system was criticized for instantly rejecting an important number of Syrian 
refugees directly at the border, in violation of both the Refugee Convention and the 
European Convention on Asylum and for shifting responsibilities to Eastern Euro-
pean states, often seen as unprepared or ill-equipped to handle large groups of asy-
lum seekers (Diab, 2017: 91).
Even so, Germany is known as a main destination for refugees in Europe. Be-
tween 2011 and 2016, Germany received 41 000 Syrian refugees (Nowrasteh, 2016). 
By comparison, the UK only resettled 2 898 Syrian refugees by 2016 (Gilbert, 2017), 
with a more uncertain record of employment. Only 1.1 percent of the Syrian refugees 




arriving in Germany spoke the language (Nowrasteh, 2016). Despite language diffi-
culties, 73 percent of the Syrian refugees (30 000) were reported to have found a job 
with a salary that made them subject to social insurance contributions (Knight, 2016). 
A qualitative analysis of Syrian refugees in Germany actually found that most of 
them were somewhat or highly skilled (Smith, 2016). 
Studies show that the recent intake of refugees after the 2015 has resulted in the 
biggest population increase in more than 20 years and has boosted Germany’s popu-
lation by more than one percent (Loo, 2016). For instance, Germany has a high percent-
age of Syrian doctors, who represent the fourth largest group among foreign doctors in 
the country (2 159 Syrian doctors are said to presently practice in Germany) (Loo, 2016).
While North America received far fewer Syrian refugees than Europe or the 
Middle East, their characteristics are slightly different from those based in Europe. 
Among the 26 615 Syrian refugees who came to Canada between 2015 and 2016, a 
significant segment is of working age (18 years and above), generally male (Magnet 
Today, 2017). Seventeen percent of the Syrian refugees arriving in Canada have under-
graduate or graduate studies. For Toronto, where 6 805 Syrian refugees were settled, 
the skills figure is even higher: over 55 percent of them come with high occupational 
skills and experience, according to the same study (Magnet Today, 2017). 
The case of Canada presents a singular mixed policy that combines governmental 
funds with private funds for refugees. As such, 65 percent of the Syrian refugees are 
privately sponsored, 27 percent arrived through government assistance, and 8 percent 
through mixed sponsorship (Grant, 2016). While 12 percent of the government-spon-
sored refugees found work in 2016, more than half of the privately sponsored Syrians, 
who are also more skilled and tend to have higher rates of university degrees, are 
already integrated into the job market (ccirc, 2017).
However, the educational level for almost one-third of the Syrian population in 
Canada has not been assessed. Syrian families arriving in Canada have an average 
of five to eight members, much larger than Canadian families. Their integration is 
more difficult due to the scarcity of large homes and, sometimes, to the fact that only 
one or two of the family members, generally men, are working. 
Canada fulfills a similar role to that of Germany in the North American region. 
It is more open than the U.S. to receiving refugees for humanitarian purposes, under 
conditions of low population density and an aging society. In 2015, Canadians over 
the age of 65 outnumbered those under 15 for the first time, a disproportion that the 
Canadian government is trying to resolve through its immigrant-friendly policy. In 
particular, Canada has welcomed Syrian refugees as a “national project” and as part 
of its longstanding humanitarian tradition (iecbc, 2016). According to Immigration 
Minister John McCallum, “More immigrants for Canada would be a good policy for 




demographic reasons” (Mohdin, 2016). Canada´s plan is to increase the intake of eco-
nomic migrants and skilled workers, who had been blamed in the UK and the U.S. 
for depressing wages and taking jobs from locals. Canada actually admitted 55 800 
refugees in 2016 and 40 000 in 2017. This may be explained by the diminishing flow 
of Syrian refugees, which reached its peak in 2015 and then dropped. 
The Syrian refugees arriving in the U.S. have similar characteristics to those in 
Canada. Compared to Europe, where refugees are allowed entry into the European 
countries and then apply for asylum, the U.S. applies an enhanced screening process 
for all the Syrian refugees entering U.S. territory (Global Ministries, 2018). Of the 18 
000 Syrian refugees welcomed in the U.S. since 2011, 25 percent are men escaping 
terrorists, condemned by isis for leaving Syria and rejecting its extremist ideology 
(Global Ministries, 2018). To prevent terrorism, 27 U.S. states opposed accepting Syrian 
refugees in 2015. 
However, former President Obama approved the entry of 10 000 refugees (Gowans, 
2017). One-third of them went to California, Michigan, and Texas, where most of the 
broader Syrian immigrant population lived (Zong and Batalova, 2017). Half of them 
were children under 14. Ninety-eight percent of the Syrian refugees resettled in the 
United States were Muslim and about 1 percent Christian. 
Syrian refugees in the U.S. were later banned by President Trump in 2017, who 
issued one of his first executive orders on refugees and visa holders from designated 
nations such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and, of course, Syria. While 
the order was aimed at limiting the entry of terrorist fighters, it also affected real refu-
gees in need of humanitarian aid (Nowrasteh, 2015), who hardly compete at all for 
jobs with U.S.-born workers (Dyssegaard, Roldan, and Mathema, 2016).
Despite the encouraging characteristics of Syrian migrants in North America 
and Europe and their traditions as countries of asylum, both Mexico and Brazil have 
received few Syrian refugees after the 2011 war. In Mexico, only 16 Syrian refugees 
were registered in 2014, and no information exists about any increase in that number 
afterwards. Brazil received 400 asylum requests from Syrians in 2016, down from 1 
500 in 2014 (Renwick, 2017). Even though their number is so small, many of them find 
it difficult to get a job, as shown later in this study.
Latin America has indeed been a low receiver of Syrian refugees, but an inter-
esting destination for studying the conditions for South–South refugee resettlement. 
While Mexico lacks a governmental plan for Syrian refugees, Brazil acts as a transit 
destination, similar to Turkey, mainly due to the “lack of economic opportunities to 
convince refugees to permanently call it home” (Renwick, 2017).
The same study by Renwick shows that around 9 000 people have refugee status 
in Brazil. Syrians make up the largest group, followed by Angolan, Colombian, and 




Congolese refugees. Since 2010, Brazil has more than doubled its intake of refugees, 
but their integration into the labor market has been diminishing due to the economic 
crisis. For instance, 2 700 refugees were employed in the formal sector in Sao Paolo 
in 2014, but only 371 in 2016 (Renwick, 2017). Many refugees in Brazil work in the 
informal sector and are vulnerable to exploitation, which means this cannot be the fi-
nal option for Syrian cidsr, who may choose to apply for further asylum in Canada, 
Chile, or Germany.
Domestic Policies and National Legislation
Even though domestic and foreign policies on Syrian refugees are very linked, na-
tional programs differ if they are aimed at image promotion, humanitarian human 
resource management, and brain drain. 
Turkey’s position as a main refugee receiver has been interpreted by some au-
thors (Hintz and Feehan, 2017) as an attempt to improve its image and “occupy a 
moral high ground” in the face of European Union. In particular, about 300 Syrian 
refugees were granted the chance to apply for Turkish citizenship, a program also re-
interpreted as a way to revert the brain drain of dissident Turks. According to Hintz 
and Feehan (2017), “Rather than ending the purge that has targeted over 100 000 aca-
demics, journalists, and other educated Turks accused of being involved in terrorist 
activities, Erdoğan sees their replacements in the Syrians to whom citizenship will be 
granted. The system being drafted is similar to the points-based systems for migrants 
in Australia and Canada; through this system only those with the skills to contribute 
to Turkey’s economy will be granted permanent status in Turkey. This plan is intended to 
mediate Turkey’s ‘acute shortage’ of skilled workers, evidenced by 57 percent of 
Turkish employers reporting that they experience difficulty in finding workers to fill 
open positions.”
In general, the legislation available in the cases examined follows the national 
guidelines, besides the existence of regional agreements, as in the case of the European 
Union. Turkey is the only country that actually changed its legal framework after the 
start of the Syrian war. The New Law on Foreigners and International Protection in 
Turkey (2014) increases legal certainty for asylum seekers and refugees by establish-
ing the rights of the refugee population and giving them the possibility of enforcing 
those rights in a national court; it also increases the predictability and legality of the 
administration’s decisions. However, the law’s enforcement is not always accurate due 
to Turkey’s domestic conflicts and to its governance through executive orders. This 
situation further complicates cooperation on refugees with other EU countries.




Turkey is at the center of current debates because of its role to prevent refugees 
traveling to Europe, Currently, Turkey hosts 3 320 814 Syrians (Sirkeci, Unutulmaz, 
and Utku, 2017: 12). For a more accurate interpretation of Turkish policy on Syrian 
refugees, it is important to note at least two relevant moments. At first, Turkey had 
an open-door policy that let virtually all the Syrians into the country and, therefore, 
no record existed of their entry either (Spilda, 2017). This phase was also accompanied 
by a warm welcome by the Turkish population, who used to think that Syrian immi-
gration would be temporary. By comparison to European countries, the United States 
and Australia, refugees were not placed in any detention centers in Turkey (Civelek, 
2017) However, a second phase was accompanied by an increasing awareness that 
most of the Syrian refugees would stay. The issue was also increasingly politicized in 
Turkey as in the European countries. Refugees in general –and Syrians in particular– 
became part of a more generalized discourse that considered them an invasion that 
would abuse the welfare state (Unutulmaz, 2017: 214). This is even more evident in a 
country like Turkey, where the discourse of diversity has not been popular; on the 
contrary, “strong republican ideals of a unified nation [are] embodied in the imagi-
nation of a modern Turkish citizen” (Unutulmaz, 2017: 227).
For its part, Germany established a process of formal evaluation and recognition 
procedure for foreign qualifications under a program called “integration by qualifi-
cation” (Loo, 2016), financed with €2.2 million, available for regular migrants, but 
also for refugees. The corresponding information is available in Arabic, Dari, Farsi, 
Tigrinya, and Pashto, the languages most commonly spoken by refugees. People who 
lack documentation of their studies may undergo a “skills analysis” including the sub-
mission of work samples, interviews, or practical examinations.
Other countries such as the UK only have resettlement programs for vulnerable 
persons, but do not necessarily plan to assess their skills to integrate them into the 
job market. The UK plans to resettle 20 000 of the most vulnerable Syrian refugees by 
2020 (Gilbert, 2017). As the second largest bilateral donor supporting Syrian refu-
gees, the UK Department for International Development has provided more than 
£2.3 billion in international aid to the Syrian region since 2012 (Gilbert, 2017: 35).
In January 2016, an open letter to the prime minister supported by 120 leading 
UK economists stressed the economic indicators and arguments for welcoming refu-
gees to the country: “Refugees should be taken in because they are morally and legally 
entitled to international protection, not because of the economic advantages they may 
bring. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the economic contribution of refugees 
and their descendants to the UK has been high” (Gilbert, 2017: 45).
This is different from Canada, where refugees are only screened for criminal 
backgrounds or health problems. The government created the Syria Emergency 




Relief Fund and actively cooperates with the private sector for mixed sponsorship of 
the refugees. However, their labor integration is not a main topic of the Canadian 
approach. In the words of Senator Ratna Omidvar, “There has been an outpouring of 
support to welcome Syrian newcomers from all sectors, public and private. But miss-
ing was a clear focus on helping them find the right employment to match their skills 
and capabilities. Skilled immigrants and refugees present a great opportunity for 
our economy and for employers” (cited in Hire Immigrants, 2017).
The U.S. has offered yet another approach to integrating Syrian refugees, at least 
before the ban in 2017. The government was working with resettlement agencies to find 
locations where a previous community of Syrians migrants existed and where jobs 
and housing would be available. That is, once the Syrian refugees are accepted, the gov-
ernment would take care of their integration. However, with the change of presidency, 
President Trump depicted them as “compromised by terrorism” and threatened to send 
them back (Dyssegaard, Roldan, and Mathema, 2016: 1), as previously mentioned.
However bad this discourse may seem, other oecd countries in Latin America gen-
erally lack long-term governmental plans to receive and integrate Syrian refugees. Presi-
dential changes also have significant consequences, in Brazil like in the U.S. While 
former President Dilma Rousseff initiated talks with the EU in 2016 to accept 100 000 
refugees in the following five years, the plan was suspended under the administration 
of Michel Temer (Renwick, 2017). Brazil has a humanitarian visa for refugees, but it 
offers no resettlement plans for those who manage to pay their way into the country.
In both North America and Latin America, no evidence exists of a change in the 
national legislations on refugees due to the arrival of the Syrians, except for Presi-
dent Trump’s aforementioned ban. No regional agreements exist either, which per-
haps partially explained by the lower inflow of Syrians than in Europe and Middle 
Eastern countries.
Private and Not-for-Profit Initiatives
Few countries manage to involve the business community with skilled refugee inte-
gration, despite the fact that their working potential has been noted by various 
transnational human resource agency reports. In Europe, public-private cooperation 
for refugees has a good record. For instance, in Germany several website program-
ming courses exist, such as “Refugees on Rails” and ReBoot Kamp, among others, 
founded by German tech entrepreneurs for refugees who could later find jobs in the 
technology industry (Smith, 2016). Apparently, Germany may actually need those 
refugees to fill vacancies in engineering jobs (Smith, 2016). One interesting detail is 




that refugees who get jobs after taking these courses pay for the course of another 
refugee, encouraging help and cooperation among the Syrian community itself (Smith, 
2016: 58-9). This type of high-tech peer-to-peer economy also facilitates the donation 
of computers and volunteering activities from the engineers who teach, sometimes 
using the headquarters of companies like Microsoft and Google.
Apart from high-tech courses, other alternative initiatives exist, such as the Mi-
gration Hub, a start-up involving refugees for purposes of social innovation and en-
trepreneurship, and Kiron University, funded to help refugees finish their degrees. 
Admission at Kiron is not based on academic requirements, language tests, pass-
ports, or residency permits; it even provides each student with a free laptop and in-
ternet access. In 2016, Kiron enrolled 2 600 refugees in Germany, 80 percent of whom 
were Syrians (Loo, 2016).
A similar initiative is the Refugee Career Jumpstart Project (rcJp), a Canadian 
non-profit focused on streamlining the process between refugees’ arrival and their 
employment, with an excellent response during its fundraising campaign in big Ca-
nadian cities (Hire Immigrants, 2017). Other initiatives are oriented toward skilled 
refugees but are not tethered to any country in particular, but work globally. One is 
“Talent Beyond Boundaries,” which received 8 000 applications from skilled refu-
gees –mainly Syrians at the moment– who aim to be hired by companies around the 
world (McGhee, 2017).
By contrast, Latin American initiatives have little support from the private sec-
tor, with the exception of the Habesha project, a locally-based ngo designed to select 
an elite group of Syrian students from diverse regional and academic backgrounds 
to study in Mexico. Since its foundation in 2015, the organization has managed to 
enroll 14 Syrian students in Mexican universities. This project carefully selects the 
recipients it supports, who have to be recommended by an international institution 
and then pass through rigorous background and health checks. “We choose them 
like little pearls, and we take care of them so well. We make sure that today there’s a 
psychologist and tomorrow there’s a mathematics professor. And finally they will 
go to universities that 99 percent of Mexicans would like to attend,” says project co-
ordinator Adrian Meléndez (Weaver, 2017).
Social and Economic Integration of the Syrian cidsr
Integration problems of Syrian cidsr seem to be similar in all the countries covered 
by this study, such as limited knowledge of the language, truncated professional 
networks, and often poor physical or psychological health (Smith, 2016). These barriers 




were even higher for women, who generally lacked work experience. Due to prejudice, 
discrimination, and difficulty in recognizing credentials, many of the skilled had had 
only limited economic participation in their host countries. With time, this may 
lead “individuals to lose their capacity for skilled employment” (Smith, 2016: 52).
The conditions of reception are quite different depending on each country and 
refugees’ economic status. While Turkey certainly hosts a huge number of Syrians, they 
are not necessarily offered the best living conditions in the camps, unless they come 
from well-off families who can afford to pay rent and for their children’s education. 
An estimated 10 percent of Syrian refugees live in camps and the ones outside only 
register to get access to social services (Spilda, 2017: 54).
While in the early years of the Syrian crisis the Turkish population welcomed 
the refugees, with time, problems started due to their unsuccessful integration and 
uncertain status. Previous research shows that Syrians currently in Turkey have set up 
4 000 businesses (Hintz and Feehan, 2017), thereby helping boost the country’s econ-
omy. The problem of integrating the Syrian refugees in Turkey began with the closure 
of borders by several European countries, which determined that many refugees 
would stay in Turkey. At the same time, Syrians in Turkey complained about the is-
suance of few work permits. This, in turn, caused a change of attitude in the Turkish 
population, at a time of high domestic political instability that led to constant change 
of personnel in government institutions. At the peak of the Syrian crisis, normal leg-
islative procedure was replaced by legislation by presidential decree.
Paradoxically, being skilled may be a problem for the Syrian refugees, as the Euro-
pean Union might want to take them in, while Turkey is trying to prevent them from 
leaving the country (Demircan, 2016; Hintz and Feehan, 2017). The un refugee agen-
cy in Ankara declared that they were “aware that the Turkish government has, in some 
cases, applied educational criteria when issuing exit permits to Syrian refugees se-
lected for resettlement outside Turkey.” However, the Turkish government denied 
this. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu stated, “We are against the selective 
approach to resettlement. No one can say ‘I want to get the Christians; I want to get 
the best educated ones, the [able-bodied] ones and not the disabled.’ A selective ap-
proach is not humane. You cannot select people like you select sheep and goats at the 
market” (cited in Feldman, 2016).
Even when the German government accused Turkey’s administration of bad 
practices, the arrival of Syrian refugees in Germany also brought problems. Some of the 
shortcomings of the skills assessment process in Germany have been its concentra-
tion in the fields of teaching, engineering, nursing, and medicine, as well as its excessive 
formalization, incompatible with a very fast process of expulsion and the differences 
between the educational systems of Syria and Germany (Loo, 2016).




However, the social integration of Syrian refugees has been object of state poli-
cies in Germany, where the native population has been trained by the principles of 
the Willkommenskultur (the welcoming culture). Syrian refugees were offered cheap 
language classes, and citizens were called upon to help them and make them feel 
welcome (Smith, 2016: 41).
The German government also promoted the use of social entrepreneurship to 
integrate Syrian refugees in an increasingly multicultural context that could “enhance 
the competitiveness of Germany’s economy” (Smith, 2016: 43). According to the re-
sults of Smith’s fieldwork (2016), among the Syrian refugees in Germany are many 
professionals with higher education and multilingual training, whose main desire is 
to be reunited with their families.
By comparison, the Syrian refugees in the UK arrive with a vulnerability assess-
ment by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (unhcr) in Turkey, 
Jordan, or Lebanon. In the UK, aid is administered locally, and refugees are provided 
with housing, educational services, safety briefings, and orientation. The vulnerabil-
ity assessment prioritizes those refugees who cannot be supported effectively in the 
Syrian region, such as women, children, the elderly, victims of torture and sexual vio-
lence, and the disabled. This leads me to conclude that the refugees who make it to 
the UK are not necessarily the most skilled but the most vulnerable. The selection is 
based mainly on humanitarian considerations.
Refugees in North America have faced similar integration problems, and many 
are still unemployed after more than a year in Canada or the U.S. “While Canada has 
won praise for its warm welcome of newcomers, experts see room for improvement 
in smoothing their transition into the work force” (Grant, 2016). Canada has a mixed 
system of selection for government assisted refugees (gar) and privately sponsored 
refugees (psr). The former are accepted exclusively based on humanitarian concerns, 
like in the UK. gars have larger families than psrs, sometimes of up to 14 persons, 
and 60 percent of them are children 14 or younger (cheo, 2016). Two-thirds of them 
do not speak English or French. This means that for Canada, gars would be more of 
a humanitarian investment at the moment than a medium-term economic scheme. 
By comparison, privately sponsored refugees, who often have advantageous family 
networks and higher educational levels, tend to integrate better economically and 
socially. Syrian refugees, be they gars or psrs, normally go to Toronto, Montreal, and 
Vancouver, the three largest cities and main receivers of migrants in Canada. How-
ever, on a per-capita basis, it was the mid-size Canadian cities that saw the greatest 
proportional impact of the Syrian refugee flow (Friesen, 2016).
While Syrian refugees have benefitted from two entry options in Canada, their situ-
ation in the U.S. has been quite different. They were only received through governmental 




programs and their integration to the U.S. society has been obstructed by a distorted 
image of what Syrian migrants are. Some common beliefs were that the Syrian refu-
gees are welfare-dependent and will be a drain on economy, when actually the Syrian 
population in the U.S. has proven to be even more entrepreneurial than the native-born 
(Global Ministries, 2018). In the U.S., some Syrian men stated they were dependent 
on welfare because of bad health conditions or because, if they worked, they would 
be offered a minimum-wage job. As heads of households, men are more under pres-
sure than women to find work. “[English] classes are mandatory, but they tell us work 
is also mandatory,” says a refugee in the U.S. (Frej and Abdelaziz, 2017).
Nevertheless, Syrians’ profile in the U.S. is quite promising. Although Syrian 
refugees represent a new flow to the United States, a small Syrian immigrant com-
munity has been residing there since the late nineteenth century. As of 2015, approx-
imately 83 000 people born in Syria resided in the United States, accounting for less 
than 0.2 percent of the overall foreign-born population of 43.3 million (Zong and 
Batalova, 2017). This small community of Syrian immigrants has higher educational 
and English proficiency levels than the overall foreign-born population, according to 
the same authors, since 39 percent are college graduates, as opposed to 30 percent of the 
U.S.-born. In general, Syrian women have relatively low work force participation, 
but 49 percent of the Syrian men in the U.S. are employed in high-skilled occupations, 
for example, managerial, business, and science positions (Global Ministries, 2018). 
This means that Syrian refugees, both men and women, will be integrated into a 
highly competitive Syrian community and their contribution to the U.S. economy 
promises to be high.
The aforementioned Zong and Batalova study (2017) shows that Muslim immi-
grants in general have been better integrated into U.S. society than in many Western 
European countries, where many report feeling marginalized and alienated. This is 
also the case in Latin American countries, as the last section of testimonies shows.
Testimonies of Syrian CIDSR
This final part of the article has the purpose of revealing how re-skilling and de-skill-
ing affects the integration of Syrian professionals. In this respect, the testimony of 
many skilled Syrians in the selected countries illustrates similar problems. 
First, they talk about the need to deal with smugglers to get to a safer place in a 
neighboring country or in Europe, about the uncertainty of their future, and their fears 
regarding returning to Syria for the moment. For instance, Essa Hassan (29), a Syrian 
student hosted by Mexico, does not know when and if he will return to Syria. In the 




meantime, he plans to study a master’s in social engineering and make a contribution 
in Mexico. “When you see the blood, you know it’s not going to end any time soon.…
The first goal for me really is to give something back” (cited in Zissis, 2018). Similarly, 
Syrian professionals interviewed in various countries appreciate the opportunity of 
having escaped, of being alive, and are thankful to the county that received them 
“If I’m looking toward the future…, there is dignity [in the U.S.].…At the end of the 
day, they did give us health care. I want to work so I can pay taxes, to thank this 
country” (Taqi, chef, interviewed by Frej and Abdelaziz, 2017).
Secondly, they recall the difficulties in finding a job, despite their previous expe-
rience in Syria and extra courses in the country of arrival. In particular, I recall the 
case of Adnan Almekdad (interviewed by Grant, 2016), a former veterinarian owner 
of an animal clinic back in Syria, former manager and strategist at several pharma-
ceutical start-ups, and the author of two books. Adnan now lives in Canada with his 
wife and three daughters and has made friends and learned English, but could not 
find a job after a year as a refugee. “I am skilled. I have experiences in working, man-
agement, [and] manufacturing processes. It’s hard.”
Syrian cidsr demonstrates the high costs of translation of professional degrees, 
which most refugees cannot pay. For skilled refugees, not having employment is a 
complete obstacle in the integration process; therefore, in their cases, labor integration 
may determine the path for cultural and social integration as well. “I want to find a 
job before the end of the first year, because it’s a long time to sit and wait. Canada 
means many things to me, and one is to find a job or a business....You know, you 
don’t feel like a citizen if you don’t have a job; you don’t belong” (Almekdad cited in 
Grant, 2016).
Thirdly, long wait periods for a skilled job de-skills people, as big gaps in their 
resumes are negatively interpreted by the employers, even though many appreciate 
that with time, they have acquired resiliency and adaptability. In order to reactivate their 
skills and fight employers’ prejudices, refugees who have been inactive for a num-
ber of years may have to train again and strengthen their resumes (Gilbert, 2017).
Fourthly, the desire to integrate is quite high, even at the price of a temporary 
distance from the Syrian culture and community abroad. Contrary to the U.S. expe-
rience, where Syrian refugees are resettled within the Syrian community, in Canada, 
they manifest a wish for integration even at the cost of not being with their own. 
Says Richard, a former medical doctor in Syria, now in Canada, “I think if you’re go-
ing to be Canadian, you should be with Canadians, act like a Canadian, speak like a 
Canadian. And be friends with Canadians....If you want to be successful in this coun-
try, you have to stay outside your community, and work with other communities 
and with other cultures” (interviewed by Hire Immigrants, 2017).




Lastly, Latin American countries like Brazil and Mexico seem to be more open 
and tolerant toward the refugees, in contrast with other oecd economies where Syrian 
migrants are already seen through stereotyping lenses. Says Mexican Habesha proj-
ect coordinator Melendez, “There are no stereotypes about Syrians here. There are no 
stereotypes about Muslims. So it’s very easy for them to come, and people will be 
welcoming. It means we’re able to create our own narrative about Syria, about Islam 
about Middle East cultures because we don’t have one” (cited in Zissis, 2018).
Apparently, Latin American countries may also serve as alternative destinations 
for skilled refugees rejected by European countries. Says Saeed Mourad, a former or-
thopedic surgeon in Syria, now running a restaurant in Sao Paulo, Brazil, “At first 
I thought we’d go to England, where I [studied medicine], but they didn’t accept 
me.…We brought our own money with us. I will never [have to] live in a camp or a 
tent. Not all refugees can do what I did, because they don’t have the money. If the war 
stopped today, I would be in the first line to go back to Damascus.” At the same time, 
he would prefer to be in the U.S. with one of his sons, but he knows he will not get a 
visa under the Trump presidency (cited in Renwick, 2017).
conclusions 
The study of both skilled and unskilled Syrian refugees imposes a return to the theo-
retical perspective of Diasporas in the original understanding of the concept, that is, 
displaced people driven abroad by multiple traumas of departure. As such, I pro-
pose the study of Syrian refugees as a necessary change of framework from econom-
ically-induced skilled migration to conflict-driven migration.
My main findings involve the conceptual differences between conflict-induced 
and economically-induced displacement of the skilled, as well as international coop-
eration for skilled refugees. Globalization allows the coexistence of cosmopolitan 
migrants working in transnational companies who reject belonging to one nation in 
particular, along with the vulnerability of refugees who would like to belong to any 
country. At one extreme, we have those who have a nationality and a steady place to 
live but reject being stable; at the other, we have professional refugees who do not have 
a country to live in, but would like to put down roots again. Both are skilled mi-
grants; they just belong to different national backgrounds. Some seem to have been 
born in unluckier places. 
Even when the economic explanation of skilled migration has overshadowed 
the humanitarian one, it is necessary to study both patterns to understand the dis-
placement of the skilled. Compared with planned migration, cidsr lacks clear spatial and 




temporal limits: migrants do not know when and if they will return to their homes; and 
they do not really get to choose their countries of destination, but go where they 
are accepted. Certification processes are also more complicated in the case of cidsr: 
as many of the skilled refugees do not bring their diplomas, and they have not stud-
ied the language of the destination country in advance. Therefore, cidsr is accompa-
nied by a double process of de-skilling and re-skilling, in which refugees have to 
reinvent their lives and careers.
From the point of view of international cooperation, regional policies toward 
refugees in general –and skilled in particular– are few, if any. This makes it impossi-
ble to coherently compare North America and Europe, but also leaves space for region-
al agreements and cooperation on cidsr. 
While evidence does exist of Syrian cidsr being used for human capital purpos-
es in certain countries with aging demographics (Germany and Canada) or to solve 
previous domestic brain drain problems (Turkey), Syrian refugees tend to be selected 
based on humanitarian purposes, rather than on their skills. All the countries included 
in this study, but perhaps more explicitly in the case of Turkey, want to position them-
selves as places that welcome foreigners, as “moral powers” as opposed to the anti-
migrant discourse promoted by right-wing parties in the U.S. and Europe.
Even so, this overall survey of the policies for Syrian cidsr in selected oecd coun-
tries has proven the need for better labor integration policies for skilled refugees that 
would benefit both the individuals and the destination countries. As opposed to brain 
drain produced by economic migration, better work opportunities for skilled refu-
gees do not affect the countries of origin more than the damage caused by exile itself.
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